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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES
AND APPRAISED VALUES IN THE HOTEL
APPRAISAL PROCESS, 1981-1998
Michael C. Dalbor
and
William P. Andrew
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to examine the economic circumstances that motivated principals in the hotel appraisal process to influence appraised hotel values.
The economic circumstances are the background in which appraisals are completed
and may be germane to the issue of appraisal accuracy. This paper outlines the
relationships in the process and examines the specific circumstancesthat may have
motivated the parties to influence appraised values to be different than market values. Moreover, it provides a basis for further research and empirical tests of these
rela tionships.

Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine the economic circumstances that impacted
the motivations of principals in the hotel appraisal process. This paper will describe how
mffering economic circumstances may have changed the desires of the principals across
periods of time, potentially changing appraised values relative to market values. T h s
paper discusses how a strong economy and other circumstances influenced most principals to want appraised hotel values to be higher than market values. On the other hand,
economic circumstances such as changes in tax laws or increased monitoring by federal
regulators may have influenced principals to want appraised hotel values to be lower
than market values.
The paper first describes the important relationships in the hotel appraisal process. A
brief review of appraisal accuracy literature is provided, along with a discussion of the
serious nature of the appraisal accuracy problem. The economic circumstances of three
mstinct periods are detailed next, including a discussion of the importance of lenders in
the appraisal and their motivations. Some descriptive data are subsequently provided
and followed by conclusions and recommendations for further research.

Important Relationships in the Process
1

,

The appraiser is the agent of various principals in the hotel appraisal process. The
principals include the lender, buyer, seller, and appraisal monitoring authority. During
the 1980s, the buyer typically commissioned an appraiser directly and would subsequently use the appraisal to "shop" for permanent financing. Although the other parties
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were not explicit principals, they could provide selective or incomplete information to an
appraiser in an effort to influence value. Additionally, there was no unified appraisal
licensing authority that could regulate appraisers. Without an effective monitoring
authority, appraisers were much more subject to the desires of the buyer, seller, and
lender.
The relationshps in the process changed in 1989because of the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA). Buyers could no longer commission
an appraisal directly if they were going to obtain financing from a federally insured lending institution. Instead, appraisals were to be commissioned by lenders, thereby making
the lender the most influential party in the process. The decision to make the lender
responsible for commissioning appraisals was to help solve appraisal problems. Additionally, appraisers were expected to be licensed and/or certified and to complete
appraisals that met more stringent standards.
In the 1990s, however, some researchers (Rudolph, 1994; Petuck, 1996) are skeptical
about whether or not federal and state regulations have effectively altered the motivations of the parties in the appraisal process regarding appraisal accuracy. Additionally, a
recent survey of appraisers conducted by Smolen and Hambleton (1997) indicates that
nearly 80% of appraisers reported that aggressive lenders are still asking them to change
appraised values. Therefore, without the appropriate incentives to encourage accurate
appraisals on a consistent basis, appraised values may be systematically hgher or lower
than market values based upon the needs of the influential parties in the process. The
needs of the parties may vary from time to time, depending on the prevailing economic
and regulatory environment.

Literature Review
A review of the literature reveals appraisal accuracy concerns during particular time
periods (such as the 1980s) without establishing similarities to or differences from other
periods. Additionally, there has been only a limited amount of research completed about
the agency relationshps in the appraisal process. Thus, an examination of exogenous factors affecting the motivations of the parties in the process may help explain changes in
appraisal outcomes.
In a perfect steady state economy, appraised values should not differ significantly
from sales prices in a systematic fashion. However, changes in economic circumstances
or the regulatory environment may induce bias into t h s process. T h s is detailed by
Webb (1994) who shows sign changes of differences between appraised values and sales
prices of commercial properties during different time periods from 1978 through 1990.
Similarly, we can examine why there are distinct time periods that involve changes in
appraised values.
The 1980s period is considered distinct primarily because of the tremendous effect
the 1981 Tax Reform Act had on commercial real estate markets (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 1997).This tax law change, combined with an improving economy of 1983-1984, produced an environment that encouraged real estate development.
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Additionally, economic conditions were also generally favorable in the late 1980s. These
circumstances provided an incentive for parties in the hotel appraisal process to want appraised values to be higher than market values.
Conversely, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 largely had a negative impact on real estate
returns. A study by Follain, Hendershott, and Ling (1987) details the expected impact on
real estate returns because of the decelerated depreciation schedules for commercial real
estate. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 also restricted the deductibility of passive losses of
real estate investments. T h s change in the tax law may have had an opposite effect from
the 1981 tax law change. Principals in the process may have been loolung to sell hotel
properties rapidly, thereby influencing appraised hotel values to be lower than market
values during the period immediately surrounding the enactment of Tax Reform Act of
1986.
Major regulatory changes affecting lendersprimarily savings and loan institutionehave been researched extensively by Kane (1989). The problems associated with
commercial lending and appraisal practices were widely publicized by the U.S. House
Committee on Government Operations (1986) in a startling report. A need for federal
regulation of appraisers was not only recognized by legislators, but by appraisers themselves (Dislun, Maroney, & Vickory, 1988; Duvoisin, 1988). This led to the enactment of
FIRREA in late 1989, opening a new chapter in terms of the hotel appraisal process.
FIRREA changed the appraisal landscape significantly by 1990. New appraisal standards and guidelines were to be implemented along with state licensing as described by
Hicken (1991). The Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) began cleanup operations of insolvent savings and loans by selling non-performing assets. Moreover, the Appraisal
Institute was formed in 1991 to bolster confidence in the profession after much negative
publicity in the late 1980s.
I
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With all of the measures coming into effect, the appraisal environment of the early
1990s was very different from that of the 1980s. Hanford (1994) and Petuck (1996)
describe the overzealous and critical nature of commercial appraisal reviews. Appraisers
were generally of the opinion that the regulatory pendulum had swung too far. This
environment, however, was not to last very long.
By 1993, appraiser certification licensing laws had been phased in. A variety of new
banlung laws that had been enacted in previous years began to improve the condition of
the nation's banking system (FDIC, 1997). Moreover, the United States was at the beginning of an economic expansion that is still in effect today. These changes led to a more
relaxed atmosphere for appraisers, with comparisons of the mid-1990s being made to the
1980s (Petuck, 1996).The survey by Smolen and Hambleton (1997)also reveals the generally pro-development attitude of lenders during this period.
With the establishment in the literature of three different historical periods over the
past two decades, we can examine the specific circumstances within each period that
may have influenced the parties in the appraisal process toward wanting higher or lower
appraised hotel values.

bcononzic Circumstances
Economic Circumstances 1981-1989
Based upon an examination of economic indicators, the two recessions of the early
1980s were from January through July 1980 and July 1981 through November 1982 (Rogers, 1994).These recessions contributed to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1981in
estate development by increasing real estate depreciation tax shelds.
The tax sheld increase, combined with the availability of large foreign and domestic
commercial real estate (Roulac, 1994). For examp& new hotel room construction in the
160,000 in 1985, and approximately 150,000 in 1986.l
Hotel supply generally lags behnd an increase in demand by approximately 18 to 24
chise, secure financing, and complete construction. heref fore, an improving economy in
late 1982 or early 1983 could initiate the hotel development process and result in a newly
completed hotel sometime in 1984.
Table 1 shows the U.S. average hotel occupancy and new hotel room construction ac1984, whch led to new hotel room construction in 1985 and 1986. The new rooms decreased occupancy somewhat in those two years, but demand remained relatively strong
throughout the rest of the decade. In fact, according to PKF Consulting data, occupancy
levels increased steadily from 1986 through 1989 as shown in table 1.
Table 1
New hotel room construction and annual occupancv
Year
New Hotel Rooms
Average Annual Occupancy Rate
1983
120,000
64.4%
1984
140,000
67.8%
1985
160,000
66.9%
1986
150,000
65.6%
1987
120,000
65.8%
1988
110,000
66.3%
1989
110,000
67.2%
Note. The new hotel rooms column data are rounded.
The data in this table are adapted from Bill Saporito, "Boom at the Inn," Time, July 8,1996, p. 43 and PKF
Consulting, Trends, 1983-1989.

Saporito, Bill, "Boom at the Inn," Time, 8 July 1996, p. 43.
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The tax incentives of the 1981 Tax Reform act improved the return performance of
commercial real estate by increasing the depreciation tax shield. In this environment,
lenders such as commercial banks, thrifts, pension funds, and life insurance companies
sought to increase real estate lending. This encouraged them to have appraisals comple&d that would justify a lending decision.
1

I

1

In the days before FIRREA, developers could commission an appraisal themselves
and then subsequently "shop" the appraisal around in search of financing. Developers,
who wanted to build hotel rooms, had a vested interest in obtaining an appraised value
at or above construction cost. Commercial loan officers at commercial banks and thrifts
were eager to earn loan origination fees and receive the developer's business. These parties could easily influence the appraiser, who was heavily dependent on them for
business. Thus, the relationships motivated developers and lenders to increase appraised
values.

The Role of Lenders during the 1980s

I
5

Commercial banks and thrifts played a large role in the increase in hotel room supply
in the 1980s. Some of them, because of a large increase in interest rates in the early 1980s
and the resulting disintermediation, were forced into "gambling" on real estate projects
in order to earn hgher returns. Commercial lenders, particularG commercial bankssand
thrifts, were seriouslv committed to increasing
the amount of commercial real estate
u
loans in their portfolios. As an example of that commitment, the increased involvement
by banks in commercial real estate through the 1980s is shown in the table 2.
./

Table 2
Real estate and commercial real estate loans for domestic
national banks in the United States. 1981-1989
Year

Total Loans
(in millions)

Real estate
loans
(in millions)

As a percentage of total
loans

Commercial
real estate
loans
(in millions)

As a percentage
of total loans

1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

$669
728
786
924
998
1,073
1,113
1.185
1,271

$168
180
200
232
264
308
358
408
466

25.1%
24.7%
25.4%
25.1%
26.4%
28.7%
32.2%
34.4%
36.7%

$36
40
46
56
67
82
100
115
132

5.4%
5.5%
5.9%
6.1%
6.7%
7.6%
8.9%
9.7%
10.4%

Note. The data regarding total loans, real estate loans, and commercial real estate loans are adapted from the
Comptroller of the Currency Quarterly Journal 1981-1991, 1992, p. 125.
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investors such as pension funds became much more interested in commercial real estate
investments. According; to a 1984 survey, more funds were interested in owning; real
indication of interest in commercial propertv, including; hotels. The overall interest bv

Year

Number of funds owning real estate

Percentage owning real estate

1981
1982
1983
1984

90
120
123
132

44%
47%
50%
47%

Note. The data in this table are adapted from "Real estate investing by pension funds-1984,"
20 (September 1984), p. 24.

1

Pension World

Overall, the atmosphere of many lenders seelung higher returns via commercial real
estate may have motivated lenders and others in the process to seek hgher appraised
values.

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and Other Changes
By 1986, the circumstances affecting commercial real estate development began to
T h s act and a subsequent improvement in economic conditions encouraged extensive
- -

1

-

ple, one study showed a 30city average commercial office vacancy rate for 1980 to be
only 4.2%,but by 1986, the vacancy rate increased to 17.2%.2 Given the large increases in
new hotel construction, investors began to worry about oversupply. This oversupply had
a carryover effect into the late 1980s and early 1990s, exerting downward pressure on
appraised values.
Another major effect was the Tax Reform Act of 1986. This legislation had a negative
impact on the commercial real estate industry because of the treatment of passive losses
and the lengthening of depreciation schedules. At the time, experts tried to predict what
effects the 1986 Tax Reform Act would have on real estate returns. Brueggeman and
Thibodeau (1987) hvpothesized that in order to maintain investment returns for inves-

'Wheaton, William C., "The Cyclic Behavior of the National Office Market," Amel-ican Real
Estate and Urban Economics Association Journal, Vol. 15 (1987), p. :
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period would have to decline between approximately 17%and 25% to maintain the rates
made some investors and lenders (particularly institutional lenders) reconsider financing hotel projects. Some principals who had only become involved in the hotel business
for tax purposes wanted to sell properties fast or only lend on lower-priced "bargain"
properties. Economic conditions not only lowered prices, but may also have encouraged
lower appraised values in the period immediately before, during, and after the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 (i.e., 1985-1987).
Economic circumstances had encouraged aggressive development in most hotel markets throughout most of the 1980s. This increase in supply was beginning to exert an
adverse impact on hotel operating performance by the end of the decade. The average
12% of total revenue in 1981. Despite some modest increases in occupancy during the
figure subsequently fell to a low of negative

5% in 1987. The taxable income figure

Additionally, commercial banks were forced to handle more real estate problems. As
the decade wore on and the oversupply of commercial real estate increased, banks were
foreclosing on an increasing number of mortgages secured bv commercial properties.

Table 4
Real estate owned bv domestic national bartks. 1981-1989
Year
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

Total Assets
(in millions)
$1,202
1,296
1,392
1,497
1,630
1,740
1,770
1,846
1,976

Real estate owned"
(in millions)
$1.5
2.5
2.9
3.3
3.9
5.0
6.2
6.7
9.2

As a percentage
of total assets
.12%
.19%
.21%
.22%
.24%
.29%
.35%
.36%
.47%

Note. The data regarding real estate owned means other than bank premises. The data are adapted from the
Comptroller of the Currency, Quartel-ly Journal 1981-1991, 1992, p. 116.

Pannell Kerr Forster, k d s in the Hotel l n d u s t ~ y(1991), p. 5.
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While the real estate owned statistics include all types of real estate, they correlate
strongly with the number of hotel failures during the 1990s. By the late 1980s, hotel failures had increased 40% over 1984 levels. Historical hotels and other lodging place failure
statistics are shown in table 5.

Hotel and other lodging place business failures in the United States, 1984-1997
Year

Number

1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

245
303
313
336
313
260
411
510
495
424
334
322
233
261

1

Note. The data is this table are adapted from Dun and Bradstreet's
Record of Business Failui-es, 1984-1997.

The aggressive position of lenders, brokers, and others in the development of new
- -

-

dition. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 may have changed the hotel investment environment
during the time period immediately preceding and following the passage of the legslation. Nevertheless, after the initial impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 had "shaken out"
the market, a relatively strong economy prevailed and continued to encourage hotel
investment. On the other hand. the continuing ~roblemswith commercial lenders forced

fl

I
1

1989. T h s legslation altered the relationships between the parties in the process and got
government authorities more involved in the monitoring of appraisal practices.

Economic Circumstances 199Q-1992
For thrifts and commercial banks, earlv warnings of problems with the deposit insursavings and loan insurance funds. The Federal savings and Loan Insurance corporation

1
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(FSLIC) became insolvent by 1986, and the FDIC experienced two consecutive years of
losses in 1988 and 1989.~FSLIC was finally dissolved when FIRREA was enacted in
August 1989.
I

i
"

1

FIRREA sent a signal to the nation's lending institutions that the government was
going to pursue extensive monitoring practices in the heretofore largely unmonitored
lending process. As previously stated, FIRREA intended to force appraisers to be more
rigorous in their analysis of properties, and for banks to be much more familiar with the
appraisal process. Moreover, the legislation would like appraisals to have greater consideration in the loan approval process.
In the meantime, while new appraisal standards were being phased in during this
period, economic conditions had begun to decline. Another recession began in July 1990
and lasted through March 1991. In terms of hotel values, the Hotel Motel Brokers of
America (HMBA) reported the peak selling price to be $23,630 per room in 1988. Three
years later, the average sales price was $18,400 per room, a decline of approximately 22%.
Thus, it appears that the Brueggeman and Thibodeau study, which predicted a decline in
value of between 17%and 25%, was reasonably accurate. An oversupply of hotel rooms,
declining economic conditions, and uncertainty in the lending community had had a
negative impact on hotel sales prices.
An examination of the changes from late 1980s to the early 1990s in hotel occupancy,
average room rate, and RevPAR describes national market conditions for the hotel industry. Historical hotel operating statistics are shown in table 6.
Table 6
Average annual occupancy average room rate and
RevPAR in the United States, 1988-1996
Year

Occupancy %

ADR $

RevPAR

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

66.3%
67.2%
66.2%
65.2%
66.0%
67.5%
70.4%
71.5%
71.1%

$72.67
$73.24
$78.76
$75.14
$77.05
$77.47
$79.56
$84.46
$91.60

$48.18
$49.21
$52.14
$48.99
$50.85
$52.29
$56.01
$60.39
$65.13

Note. The data in t h s table are adapted from PKF Consulting, fiends, 1988-1996.

Dotsey, M. & Kuprianov, Anatoli, "Reforming Deposit Insurance: Lessons from the Savings
Bank of Richmond) Vol. 76 (1990), pp. 3-28.
and Loan Crisis," Economic Review (Federal Rese~*ve
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As shown in table 6, 1991 was the worst year for the hotel industry in many years.
Both occupancy and average room rate declined, with occupancy lower than at any time
in the 1980s. Additionally, hotels were forced to cut rates to even maintain a relatively
low level of occupancy. These circumstances, combined with new regulations, were impacting the motivations of the lenders to the hotel industry.

Commercial Lenders 1990-1 992
Commercial banks and thrifts were forced to handle an increasing amount of foreclosed real estate. The percentage of national bank assets that were RE0 had increased
from .12 percent in 198; to .73 Grcent in 1990 and .89 percent in 1991. Additionally, the
number of hotel failures was rising dramatically. As shown in table 5, hotel failures averaged 472 per year during the 1
By this time, the full effect of FIRREA had been felt. In August 1990, government regulations stipulated that for appraisal purposes, an outside appraiser was to be hired
directly by the financial institution or its designated agent. The appraiser was expected
to have no direct or indirect in1:erest in the property being appraised. Additionally, banks
were to begin using state certified or licensed appraisers no later than December 31,1992
(Hicken, 1991).
Commercial bank officers were very much aware that they were being scrutinized
carefully after FIRREA was enacted. here was pressure on banks that owned hotels to
sell them to satisfy federal regulators and "get them off the books." A low appraisal
could help sell the property more quickly and give the impression of bank management
competency if the sales prices of assets were above appraised values.
In addition, banks that we!re providing financing for buyers were also cautious and
wanted to decrease exposure by lowering loan amounts via lower appraisals and by
requiring increased equity contributions from buyers. Commercial lenders have long
been aware that increasing loan-to-value ratios exemplifies risky behavior (Von Furstenberg, 1970).Banks wanted to demonstrate to federal regulators a decrease in risky behavior because of the increased monitoring from federal regulators.
In an agency theory context, an agent may take actions in his best economic interest
even if they are detrimental to the principal. By the early 1990s, the agents (the bank
owner and managers) were well aware that principals (the depositors and the deposit
insurance fund) were monitoring them to ensure outcomes in the agents' best interests.
In t h s case, that meant talung actions to reduce loan losses and depletion of the deposit
insurance fund.
Regulatory forbearance was a policy where federal regulators kept insolvent banks
open in hopes of not disrupting the banking system and thinlung that economic conditions would improve to rescue insolvent banks. The regulatory forbearance policy of the
1980s was also applied to savings and loans in the southwestern United States, particularly Texas (Cole, 1993). However, the FDIC, which closed relatively few banks in the

1

1

1

early and mid 1980s, began to close a large number of banks during the late 1980s and
into the early 1990s. The number of closings is shown in table 7.
Table 7
FDIC closing and assistance transactions in the United States, 1980-1992
Year

Number

1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

10
10
42
48
79
120
138
184
200
206
168
124
120

Note. These data include national banks, state member banks, federal
savings banks and state savings banks. Adapted from the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Annual Report, 1995, p. 107.

Additional evidence of monitoring the agents at banks is an examination of the number of Compliance Enforcement Actions initiated by the FDIC during the early 1990s.
These actions include cease and desist orders, removal of bank officers, and termination
of deposit insurance. The historical record of these actions is shown in table 8.
Table 8
Compliance enforcement actions initiated by the FDIC, 1989-1992
Year

Number

1989
1990

228
255

Note. These data are adapted from Federal Deposit Insurance
Co~porationAnnual Report, 1995, p. 45.

The large increase of enforcement actions in the early 1990s was a warning to bank
officers. Additionally, appraisers were also aware of the new scrutiny and were wary of
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providing overly aggressive values above sales prices. Based on the increased monitoring by federal agencies and the new appraisal regulations, the preceding evidence may
indicate that principals in the process were wary of hotel investment during the 1990-92
period, pushing appraised values below market values.

Institutional Lenders 1990-1 992
Pension funds and life insurance companies were also becoming aware of market
conditions for commercial real estate. The decreases in real estate returns due to the 1986
tax law were considered soon afterwards by Brueggeman and Thibodeau (1987) and
have already been discussed. The performance of real estate assets is measured by the
Russell-NCREIF index, whch uses quarterly appraisals and sales data (when a property
is sold) to measure performance. T h s can be used as a benchmark for the pension fund
manager.
Unlike commercial banks, however, pension fund managers value the assets in their
funds internally every quarter. Fund managers will commission an outside appraisal
once per vear, usuallv at vear-end. Nevertheless, pension fund managers have a vested
interest in the valuatLon oi the assets in their fund.l~iven
that most pension fund managers are compensated based on the value of the assets in their fund,- thev must seek hiih
returns in order to attract more capital contributions to the fund, and thus, more assets
(Gullkey, Miles, & Cole, 1989).
I

d

V
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By 1987, however, institutional managers had become concerned about the oversupply of real estate and the overvaluation of assets. Salomon Brothers, for example, issued a
report in 1986 that discussed the overvaluation of office buildings. The Russell/NCREIF
index h t a peak in 1986, with the ratio of market value to replacement cost being nearly
equal (i.e., "1"). Declines in the index began in 1987. One study estimated that office
buildings were overvalued by approximatelv 30% during the 1986-1989 period (as
compared to the Russell-NCREIF index), but the gap between the two values closed significantly by 1992 (Hendershott & Kane, 1995).
-

Fund managers had an incentive to maintain appraised values in declining markets
and "smooth" real estate returns, which may have led to overappraising of assets. However, studies have been completed which compare the sales prices of properties from the
R ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - Ndatabase
C R E Itd
F their appraised (slues. ~ l t h o u i hhotels were not included,
a study showed that sales prices exceeded appraised values for all property types from
1986 through the t h r d quarter of 1987. However, the opposite was true for properties
from the fourth quarter of 1987 through 1990 (Webb, 1994).
I

I

The oversupply and overvaluation of real estate was a concern for institutional lenders. Pension fund equity investment in real estate, which slowlv began to increase during the 1980s, peaked;n i990 and began to decline steadily afterGard;. Table 9 details the
decline in pension fund equity investment in real estate from 1987 through 1992.

I
1
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Table 9
Pension fund equity real estate investments as a percentage of assets, 1987-1992
Year

Percentage of Assets

1987
1988
1989

3.28%
3.34%
3.50%
1990
3.74%
1991
3.58%
1992
3.23%
Note. These data are adapted from Edward J. Farragher and Robert
Kleiman, "How pension funds make real estate investment decisions," Real Estate Review 25 (1996),p. 18.
Additionally, gven the fear of "oversupply" of commercial real estate in many markets at the time, institutional investors were begnning to become wary of real estate investments. Furthermore, these lenders were able to effectively assess the likely decline in
property values that was to last for an unknown period of time. As previously discussed,
hotel sales values declined significantly by the early 1990s.
Given the likely decline in values and reduced returns, institutional lenders may
have been seelung very low-priced investment opportunities in hotel properties and
commercial real estate or perhaps rejecting them altogether by the late 1980s and early
1990s. Therefore, this would provide a motivation for a lower appraisal of a property being financed to provide maximum protection of principal or even rationale to reject the
loan applicant. This may indicate that sales prices exceeded appraised values of hotels
for institutional lenders during the 1990-1992 period.

Economic Circumstances 1993-1 998
Economic circumstances had begun to improve by 1993. Construction of new rooms
in the U.S. was down to approximately 35,000 while profits were positive for the first
time since 1985. By 1994, sales prices had increased to $19,068 per room, the hghest since
1990?

I

I
I

In terms of occupancy, average daily rate, and RevPAR, the hotel industry overall
made dramatic increases over the later 1980s and early 1990s. As shown in table 6, occupancies climbed above the 70% mark for the first time since the late 1970s.
Furthermore, as shown in table 5, hotel failures declined to 233 in 1996. Between 1993
and 1997, failures averaged 315 per year, which is close to the 19841989 average of 295
annual failures.

i
5

Hotel Motel Brokers Association, HMBA Hotel Real Estate Annual Report (1995),p. 26.
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remaining wary of real estate investment. Therefore, this led them to keep appraised values lower than sales prices.
Overall, the positive economic circumstances and diminished monitoring may have
led to lenders influencing appraisers for higher appraised values. On the other hand,
institutional lenders who were "burned" by bad commercial real estate investments in
the early 1990s have shied away from extensive hotel lending despite improving economic conditions. Thus, the motivations of the principals may indeed affect appraised
values relative to market values.

Descriptive Data and Analysis
A descriptive data analysis was completed to provide a preliminary assessment of
the economic circumstances and their potential effect on appraised hotel values. A total
of 112 appraised hotel values were gathered in conjunction with their respective market
values. Since appraised values are proprietary data and not contained within a central
source, the data were difficult to obtain. Therefore, the sample sizes are relatively small
during certain periods of interest and must be considered carefully when interpreting the
results.
The data available ranged from 1985 through 1998. An observation is considered to
be the difference between the appraised value and its market values measured by (appraised value-sale priceslsales price). The sales prices of the hotels were matched to the
date of appraisal using a pricing index documented by deRoos and Corgel (1996). This
method uses a hedonic price index and is considered by academics to be the most accurate way to measure changes in lodgng values over time.
The observations were examined based upon the time periods of interest and the
types of lenders involved in the purchase (commercial or institutional). The periods are
19851987 (to show the impact of the 1986 Tax Reform Act); 1988-1989; 1990-1992; and
1993-1998. Unfortunately no data were available for 1985. The descriptive data are
shown in the table below.
Table 10
Differences between appraised hotel values and market values, 1985-1998
Period
19851987
1988-1989
1990-1992
1993-1998
1993-1998

Sample
Size

Lender Type

Expected mean
difference (+ or -)

Actual mean
difference

10
17
21
59
5

All
All
All
Commercial Banks
Institutional

-

-8.30%
+14.19%
-1.50%
+6.99%
+1.16%

+
-

+
-

Note. These data represent the mean percentage differencebetween appraised hotel values and their respective sales prices. Lender type is either commercial bank or institutional lender (insurance company pension
fund, etc.). A "+" indicates an appraised value to be higher than the sales price.

The Relationship Between Economic Circumstances and Appraised Values, 1981-1998

17

deRoos, J., & Corgel, J. (1996). Measuring lodgng property performance. Come11 Hotel
and Restaurant Administt-ation Quarterly, 35, 20-27.
Diskin, B., Maroney, P., & Vickory, F. (1986). The need for regulation of appraisers. The
Real Estate Appraises and Analyst, 52, 19-27.
Dotsey, M., & Kuprianov, A. (1990). Reforming deposit insurance: lessons from the savings and loan crisis. Economic Review (Federal Resetve Bank of Richmond), 76(2), 3-28.
Dun & Bradstreet. (19841997). Recot-d of Business Failures. New York: Author.
Duvoisin, D. (1988). The appraiser in the lending process: an ethical dilemma. The Real
Estate Appraiser and Analyst, 54(2), 15-18.
Farragher, E., & Kleiman, R. (1996). How pension funds make real estate investment
decisions. Real Estate Review, 25(4), 17-23.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. (1995). Federal Deposit lnsu~nnceCotpot.ation
Annual Repott. Washington, DC: Author.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. (1997). Histoty of the Eighties-Lessons
Future. Washington, DC: Author.

for the

Flannery, M. J., & Flannery, J. J. (1990). Causes of hotel industry distress. Real Estate
Reuiew, 20(3), 35-39.
Follain, J., Hendershott, P., & Ling, D. (1987). The impact of the 1986 Tax Reform Act on
real estate. Real Estate Review, 17(1), 76-83.
Guilkey, D., Miles, M., & Cole, R. (1989). The motivation for institutional real estate sales
and implications for asset class returns. American Real Estate and UI-ban Economics
Association Jout-nal, 17, 70-86.
Hanford, L., Jr. (1994). The reviewer is always right? The Appraisal Journal, 62(3),363-366.
Hendershott, P., & Kane, E. (1995). U.S. office market values during the past decade: how
distorted have appraisals been? Real Estate Economics, 23, 101-116.
Hicken, J. (1991). Real estate appraisers and appraisals: changes mandated by FIRREA.
Real Estate Law Journal, 20, 157-181.
Hotel & Motel Brokers of America. (1995). Eansactions. Kansas City, MO: Author.
Kane, E. (1989). The S&L insutance mess: how did it happen? Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.

18

The Jou7-nal of Hospitality Financial Management

Owens, R. (1996).On the problem of commercial appraisals. Real Estate Review, 26(2), 5-6.
Pannell Kerr Forster (19861997). fiends in the Hotel Industty (1983-1996 USA editic
Houston, TX: Author.

I

I

Petuck, S.J. (1996). Appraisers, ethics, and conflict of interest. Real Estate Review, 26(2),
Real estate investing by pension funds. (1984).Pension World 20(9), 2625.
Rogers, R. (1994). Handbook of Key Economic Indicators. New York: Irwin, Inc.
Roulac, S.E. (1994). The evolution of real estate decisions. In J. R. DeLisle & J.
(Eds.), Appt~aisal,mat-ket analysis, and public policy in real estate: essays in honor of James A.
G~aaskamp(15-63). Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Rudolph, P. (1994). Will bad appraisals drive out good? The Appt.aisa1 Journal 62(3),
U.S. House Committee on Government Operations. (1986).Impact of appraisal problems on
real estate lending, motatgageinsut-ance, and investment in the secondaty market. (House Report
99-091). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Von Furstenberg, G.M. (1970). R~skstructures and the distribution of benefits within the
FHA Home Mortgage Insurance Promam. Iournal of Monw, Ct-edit and Banking, 2(3),

I

Webb, R. (1994). On the reliability of commercial real estate appraisals: An analysis of
properties sold from the NCREIF index (1978-1992). Real state- Finance, 11, 62-

I

Wheaton, W. (1987). The cyclic behavior of the national office market. Ama-ican Real
s
Jout-nal, 15, 281-299.
Estate and UI-ban~ c i n o m i c ~ssociation

Michael C. Dalbor, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Hospitality
Management at University of Southern Mississippi. William P. Andrew, Ph.D., is an
Associate Professor of HRI Finance at Penn State University. The authors would like to
express their appreciation to the following companies for their major contributions to this
study: Cowart Hospitality Services, Hospitality Valuation Services, Koger/Molinaro
Associates, Lodging Host Hotel Corporation, Shaner Hotel Group, and Joseph J. Blake
and Associates.

